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Abstract: 
The topic of corruption has recently attracted a great deal of attention, yet there is still a lack of micro level empirical 
evidence regarding the determinants of corruption. Furthermore, the present literature has not investigated the effects 
of political interest on corruption despite the interesting potential of this link. We address these deficiencies by 
analyzing a cross-section of individuals, using the World Values Survey. We explore the determinants of corruption 
through two dependent variables (perceived corruption and the justifiability of corruption). The impact of political 
interest on corruption is explored through three different proxies, presenting empirical evidence at both the cross-
country level and the within-country level. The results  of the multivariate analysis suggest that political interest has 
an impact on corruption controlling for a large number of factors.  
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Research into the determinants of corruption has recently intensified, with an increasing number of studies 
devoted to exploring the causes and consequences of corruption at the international level. However, most of these 
studies explore corruption at the macro level while only a limited number of studies have investigated the 
determinants of corruption at the individual level (see, e.g., Mocan 2004, Swamy et al. 2001, Torgler and Valev 
2006). This empirical study aims to identify the determinants of corruption at the micro level by working with a 
set of individual level data covering a large number of countries.  We analyze a cross-section of individuals from 
the World Values Survey wave III (1995-1997) employing the perceived corruption and the justifiability of 
corruption as dependent variables. .An additional objective in this paper is to investigate whether political interest 
affects corruption by working with several different proxies of political interest, i.e. discussion intensity, interest 
in politics and importance of politics in life. Despite the increasing interest of economists in the determinants of 
corruption, the link between political interest and corruption has not yet come under intense empirical 
investigation. 
We anticipate that the use of micro-data sets will afford more insights into the corruption literature. 
However, there are benefits and drawbacks of such a data set.  One of the major advantages lies in the ability to 
investigate a broad set of countries. On the other hand, drawing conclusions from such a large data file could 
prove problematic since institutional and cultural frameworks in certain countries might influence corruption, and 
such features cannot always be controlled in a satisfactory manner. To this end, we also provide within-country 
evidence focusing on Switzerland, since the institutions in this country are not homogenous. Analyzing Swiss data 
is interesting because the degree of institutionalized political participation rights varies strongly between the 26 
Swiss cantons. 
There are five innovative aspects to this paper: 1) it explores the relationship between political interest and 
corruption using three different proxies of political interest. Previous studies have not explored this link, but rather 
have discussed the impact of formal education without considering the impact of political interest or informal 
education. 2) While we observe a large number of studies at the macro-level, we observe only a limited number of  
 
 
micro-level studies. Mocan (2004) suggests a possible cause of this deficiency in previous studies: “because 
corruption data are available only at the aggregate (country) level, existing research has focused on explaining the 
cross-country variation in corruption. Two exceptions are Swamy et al. (2001) and Svensson (2003)” (p. 2). 3) 
Most studies at the macro level focus on the perceived level of corruption without considering the willingness to 
bribe (justifiability of corruption). This study explores both aspects in detail. It is interesting to note that by 
measuring the willingness to accept corruption  we are able to investigate the social norms of compliance in a 
society. 4) We not only provide cross-country evidence at the micro level, but also explore the robustness of this 
evidence by focusing on a country that has a certain level of institutional variation (i.e. Switzerland). 5) We 
explore additional interesting factors such as trust in institutions, voice and accountability and democratic 
participation rights. 
Before considering these findings in detail, however, Section II aims to outline our theoretical approach. 




II. POLITICAL INTEREST  
 
2.1 Theoretical Considerations 
Political interest influences the extent to which individuals go about collecting, processing, and interpreting 
political matters. A government could operate with impunity if no-one is motivated to analyze the information 
available regarding its activities (Rose-Ackerman 1999).  To a certain extent, political interest leads to better 
supervision and scrutiny of the administration and governance performance and may contribute to a stronger 
sense of civic awareness among citizens. This increased knowledge possibly augments the ability to acquire 
political  information at lower costs which in turn increases the individual incentive to be informed and to discuss 
political issues.  Hence this process acts as a sort of “multiplier effect”. Rose-Ackerman (1997) states that 
corruption can be limited “by outside pressure from the public” (p. 143). A politically interested population could  
 
 
demand a higher level of transparency and may be able to better monitor and control politicians, potentially 
reducing the perceived complexity of the political process  
Politically interested citizens will associate with one another and engage in discussion.  Exchange of 
arguments and face-to-face interaction enhances group identification.  and  gives citizens the opportunity to 
identify others’ preferences. As others’ preferences become visible, the moral costs of free-riding or behaving 
illegally increase, reducing the justifiability of corruption. If political discussion is common in a society, citizens 
are confronted with arguments from both sides, those favoring and those opposing a certain political outcome, and 
this increases the overall level of information. In addition, once citizens become involved in an issue, they feel 
responsible for the result which may create a sense of civic duty and a higher willingness to comply. Thus, 
discussion provides the opportunity to clarify benefits and costs of political issues and thus increases co-operation 
among group members. This increases the  human capital involved in and developed by political matters. Mocan 
(2004) stresses that a higher stock of human capital reduces the tolerance of corruption.  
Several studies have found that political interest contributes to the probability of their being involved in 
the political process (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Political interest becomes an important explanatory 
factor in models of political behaviors from political sophistication (Carpini and Keeter 1996) to voting (Verba, 
Scholzman, and Brady 1995). Kuenzi (2006) has empirically demonstrated that civic education (non-formal 
education) has a significant positive impact on political participation. This kind of education is the result of an 
informal process that is not necessarily a part of an individual’s formal education. Nevertheless, individuals 
certainly invest energy, time and money on this informal education.  The expenses involved in being politically 
interested (represented by the costs of informal education) may outweigh the benefits (represented by increased 
accountability and transparency of the administration). In our case, we can argue that people balance the cost of 
maintaining a political interest with the benefit derived from controlling and reducing corruption, (keeping in 
mind the consequences of corruption). To demonstrate this aspect we first employ a simple model that allows 
illustration of the relationship between political interest and the level of corruption.  
 
2.2 A Simple Model  
 
 
We will first explore a general model of bureaucrats’ dishonest behavior. Let us assume that there are individuals 
engaged in production, who receive the same incomes: w. A bureaucrat is responsible for the provision of a public 
good through a production process requiring a certain infrastructure. The cost of the public good, namely c, is 
financed with income taxes. We assume that the bureaucrat is able to set the tax rate. So individuals have the 
motivation to be corrupt, particularly if they do not know the actual cost of the public good or their true tax 
burden. The bureaucrat can set a higher tax rate and divert the difference (noted by b) between tax revenue and 
the expenditure on the public good (the economic rent), into her/his pocket.  Alternatively, the bureaucrat can take 
advantage of this situation by extorting a payment in exchange for what would seem to be a “favorable” tax 
assessment, but is in fact the correct tax assessment. Klitgaard (1988) reported that tax inspectors in the 
Philippines assessed taxpayers and demanded an unrealistically large tax payment. The legal framework meant it 
was very costly and time-consuming to appeal,  and in many cases the taxpayer was unsure of their exact liability. 
Such a corruption is called extortive corruption and exists where bureaucrats have discretionary power in the 
application of rules in order to extract a rent from the private agent in the form of a bribe (Brunetti and Weder 
2003). To avoid the loss from corruption, individuals invest resources to control such behavior, complain or find 
some way to signal their refusal to accept corruption. Political interest may translate into stronger actions against 
corruption by identifying illegal treatment and reducing the willingness to accept bribes even when the costs of 
appealing are very high or the formal mechanisms of internal and external control are not functioning effectively.  
Politically disinterested individuals may surrender more easily to extortion, as they will not take into account the 
consequences and issues associated with corruption. Thus, political interest may substantially reduce the costs of 
fighting extortive corruption. Politically interested persons may find channels to reveal corrupt behavior or at least 
raise the costs of illegal behavior by demonstrating their higher willingness to use instruments for voicing 
complaints and threatening to undermine the political support for a government. In addition, the politically 
interested citizens’ process of informal education will uncover political information, helping them understand 
what is expected of a legitimate government. Such understanding reduces the constraints on potential complaints 
and puts pressure on the government and the bureaucrats to act in the public interest. This is especially important 
in countries where other means of constraining bureaucrats and politicians may be lacking. Rose-Ackerman 
(1999) points out that groups and individuals have effective avenues for challenging official actions. Although  
 
 
policies that enhance accountability and openness “are likely to be more acceptable to democratically elected 
leaders, these reforms can also have an effect in undemocratic systems whose leaders nevertheless need public 
support to retain power” (p. 144). However, it is possible that the government could stonewall any process until 
the protest groups have exhausted their energy and resources (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Bureaucrats could ignore 
the threats of lobbyists and protestors in expectation of using such a strategy. 
  Investing in political information requires time and resources, both of which hold substantial opportunity 
costs. We identify such information costs as e. We also call e informal education. Such costs may not be 
independent of living expenses l.    
Maintaining the generality of the analysis, we consider the simplest case in which an individual deals with 
a bureaucrat in a democracy. Furthermore, we assume that their utilities equal their revenues. 
The timing of the model proceeds as follows: the individual first decides whether or not to invest in 
controlling the bureaucrat through pursuing an informal education to obtain political information and maintain a 
political interest (E or NE).  The bureaucrat then chooses whether to be corrupt or not (C or NC) according to the 
individual’s decision. We therefore make use of a standard game-theoretic concept of equilibrium (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Game Tree 
 
 
The individual will forgo informal education when w-c-e < l. In this circumstance, the subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium is (NE, C), namely (w-c-b, w+b), which means that such an individual will have no incentive to 
monitor the bureaucrat. 
Individual 
Bureaucrat  Bureaucrat 
E  NE 
C NC  NC  C 






      We then analyze the interesting case where w-c-e > l. There are two possible subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibriums. 
(E, NC), namely, (w-c-e, w)                 if e < b; 
(NE, C), namely, (w-c-b, w+b)               if e > b.  
 
We can conclude that an individual will maintain a political interest so long as the cost of relevant informal 
education is not very large, and corruption will consequently be controlled.  
A fundamental premise of the model is that both the individual and the bureaucrat are in a democratic 
regime. Individuals will face higher costs of monitoring the bureaucrat in a dictatorial regime. Thus, in a 
democratic society, political interest may reduce corruption to a greater degree than in a less democratic society. 
However, it should be noted that we will control for the level of accountability when conducting the empirical 
analysis..  
The results imply that individuals will invest in informal education as long as e < b. It means individuals will 
monitor the bureaucrat if the participation cost is not very large. Under these conditions, the bureaucrat’s best 
strategy is to remain honest. Thus, in such circumstances, the political interest of individuals will help to minimize 




The data used in the present study came from World Values Survey wave III. The World Values Survey is a 
worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change. These surveys have assessed the basic values and 
beliefs of people in many countries.  The World Values Survey was first carried out in 1981-83, with subsequent 
surveys being carried out in 1990-93, 1995-97 and 1999-2001
1. We work with the third wave, as the question 
referring to individual perceived corruption has only been asked in this wave. 
For the researchers who conduct and administer the World Values Survey (WVS) in their respective 
countries, it is a requirement that they follow the methodological requirements of the World Values Association. 
                                                      
1 Data from the 1999-2001 wave became available after our study was completed.  
 
 
For example, surveys in the World Values Survey set are generally based on nationally representative samples of 
at least 1000 individuals of 18 years and above (although sometimes people under the age of 18 participate). The 
samples are selected using probability random methods, and the questions contained within the surveys generally 
do not deviate far from the original official questionnaire (for a sample of a typical World Values Survey see 
www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 
 
3.1 Dependent Variables 
Our dependent variables are perceived corruption, and the justifiability of corruption. To assess the level of 
perceived corruption from the WVS, we use the following question:  
 
How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country? 
Almost no public officials are engaged in it (1) 
A few public officials are engaged in it (2) 
Most public officials are engaged in it (3) 
Almost all public officials are engaged in it (4) 
 
The justifiability of corruption is measured with the following variable:  
 
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between: (...) someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties (1=always justified, 10= never 
justified). 
 
The interpretation of this question is that a higher value leads to lower justifiability of corruption. This variable 
can be seen as a proxy for social norms of compliance (see Torgler 2007).  
The two dependent variables used are not free from biases and problems. Use of ‘perceived corruption’ is 
in line with other indexes that employ measures of perceptions (such as the Transparency International index). 
However, perceptions are not objective, nor are they quantitative measures of the actual degree of corruption.  
 
 
Perceptions are rather an indirect way of measuring corruption (Tanzi 2002). However, when analyzing the 
Transparency International index,  Treisman (2000, pp. 410-411) presents valid arguments as to why data based 
on perceptions should be taken seriously. Components of the surveys and ratings are highly correlated among 
themselves, even though they have been conducted with different methodologies, different inputs and in different 
time periods. Such consistency allows us to conclude that factors are almost free of biases such as a “temporal 
mood” or guesses. There is also a consistency in the Transparency International over time, although the 
construction of the index varies over time. Finally, the index is strongly correlated with other corruption indexes 
such as the ICRG, the BI or the Gallup International.  
A practical method by which we can test whether the World Values Survey question about the perceived 
corruption is through the use of a useful proxy to check whether the variable is correlated with other well-known 
indexes on corruption. Thus, we compare our variable with the corruption indexes TI (Transparency 
International), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Quality of Government (Control of Corruption) 
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). The World Values Survey Corruption ratings are highly 
correlated with the TI (r= -0.878), the ICRG (r=-0.680) and the Quality of Government rating (r=-0.827)
2.  
The validity of the justifiability of corruption variable can be criticized as it reports a self-reported and 
hypothetical choice (see Swamy et al. 2001). It can also be argued that an individual who has engaged in 
corruption in the past will tend to cover up such behavior by declaring a low justifiability of corruption in the 
survey. Furthermore, cross cultural comparisons should be treated with some caution. In countries where 
corruption is widespread and delays in transactions are long, additional payments to “speed up” the process may 
be justifiable and a normal part of the administration process. The necessity of additional payments is so pervasive 
in some countries that the bureaucratic mechanism does not operate without them.  De Soto (1989) and his 
research team conducted an experiment in which they set up a small garment factory in Lima with the aim of 
complying with the bureaucratic procedures and thus behaving in accordance with the law. He reports that 10 
times they were asked for a bribe to speed up the process and on two occasions, payment of the bribe was the only 
way to continue the experiment. However, a side effect from higher justifiability of corruption due to the 
ubiquitous nature of this behaviour is that the bureaucrats have a stronger incentive to delay the transactions in 
                                                      
2 The sign is negative because for all three ratings used (TI, ICRG and Quality of Government), a  higher score corresponds to a lower 
corruption.   
 
 
order to extract further payments. Justifiability is also correlated with most other corruption measurements: it is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level but with lower r values compared to perceived corruption (TI (r= 0.358), 
the ICRG (r=0.187, not statistically significant), the Quality of Government rating (r=0.380), and perceived 
corruption (r=-0.421)). 
We have not analyzed the entire World Value Survey data set. Countries below 750 observations have not 
been included in the estimations to reduce possible biases due to a lack of representativeness
3. Furthermore, some 
countries do not have information on the dependent variables or some of the independent variables. These 
countries are therefore not considered. Furthermore, not all countries have information regarding the dependent 
and independent variables integrated in the estimations
4.  For example, Sweden could not be included as one of 
the control variables (education) has been coded differently.  
 
 
3.2 Measuring Political Interest 
We will use several proxies of political interest to investigate this main hypothesis, thereby checking the 
robustness of the results. First of all we focus on the intensity of political discussion by using the responses to the 
following survey question: 
Question: When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters 
frequently (value 3), occasionally (value 2) or never (value 1)?’. 
 
The second variable focuses on the interest in politics itself: 
Question: How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested (value 3), somewhat 
interested (2), not very interested (1).  
    
The third variable measures the importance of politics in a person’s life with the following question: 
Question: How important is politics in your life? very (4), (rather 3), not very (2), not at all (1).  
                                                      
3 Thus, Montenegro and the Dominican Republic have been omitted.  
4 For the estimations with the dependent variable perceived corruption: Japan, South Africa, Puerto Rico, China, Columbia. Estimation 
with justifiability of corruption: Japan, South Africa, Puerto Rico, Turkey and Columbia.   
 
 
The advantages of using three different proxies are demonstrated by our ability to conduct a robustness test while 
measuring different dimensions of political interest.   
 
3.3 Further Independent Variables 
The correlation between political interest and corruption could be influenced by other variables that affect 
corruption,, complicating our efforts to isolate the impact of political interest. Thus, we control for the education 
level, the marital status, political trust, institutional conditions, religion, risk attitudes, the economic situation and 




5 (continuous variable, 1=low, 9=high education) is related to citizens’ knowledge about 
corruption. To observe the relative importance of political interest, it necessary to control for formal education, as 
it is assumed that better educated individuals are more aware of government’s activities and thus would be in a 
better position to assess the degree of corruption. This may have a positive or a negative impact on the 
justifiability of corruption and the perceived corruption, depending on the actions of the government. On the other 
hand, they may be more strongly involved in corruption, understanding better the opportunities of corruption. 
Thus, the effect of education is not clear and there is a lack of empirical studies that investigate the correlation 
between education and corruption. Swamy et al. (2001), for example, disregard the variable. Mocan (2004) found 
that a higher level of  education leads to a higher probability of being targeted for bribes, yet a more educated 
population is expected to be less tolerant of corruption. ` 
 
b) Age 
                                                      
5 What is the highest educational level that you have attained?  
1.  No formal education 
2.  Incomplete primary school 
3.  Completed primary school  
4.  Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
5.  Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
6.  Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 
7.  Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 
8.  Some university-level education, without degree 




A limited number of studies have included age in their estimations. Swamy et al. (2001) consider age as a control 
variable in their estimations of the justifiability of corruption and find a positive but non-linear effect. The authors 
focused on gender differences and did not comment on this result. Mocan (2004) also uses micro data to show an 
effect of age on corruption: individuals at the age of 20 to 54 are more likely to be asked for a bribe compared to 
the reference group (younger than 20). Torgler and Valev (2006) explore the impact of age on corruption, 
differentiating between the same cohorts over time (age effect) as well as the same age groups in different time 
periods (cohort effect). The paper observes a consistent age effect, while a cohort effect is less obvious.  There are 
two major concepts that explain the correlation between age and crime: the traditional desistance theory and the 
age theory. The desistance theory asserts that the decline in crime results from factors associated with age that 
reduce or change the actors’ criminality, and older people are restrained from offending due to changes in their 
status or the exposure to anti-criminal institutions. On the other hand, the age theory is based on the idea that the 
biological aging of the organism itself has an impact on individuals’ criminal behavior (for an overview see 
Torgler and Valev 2006). Instead of using age as a continuous variable, we have formed four classes: AGE<30, 
AGE 30-49, AGE 50-64, AGE 65+, with AGE<30 as reference group, to better investigate the impact of age.  
 
c) Gender 
Research in social psychology suggests that women are more compliant and less self-reliant than men (e.g., Tittle 
1980). In the past decade, experimental research findings have shown that gender may influence aspects of 
behavior such as charitable giving, bargaining, and household decision making (see Andreoni and Vesterlund 
2001, Eckel and Grossman 2001). Evidence from the tax compliance literature shows there is a tendency for men 
to be less compliant and have a lower tax morale than women (see Torgler 2007). Further evidence regarding 
gender differences can also be found in helping behavior (see, e.g., Eagly and Crowley 1986) or ethical decision 
making (Ford et al. 1994, Glover et al. 1997 and Reiss and Mitra 1998).  
   The criminology literature provides one of the best sources for observing possible gender differences. 
Mears et al. (2000) report that men commit more offenses than women age “at every age, within all racial or 
ethnic groups examined to date, and for all but a handful of offense types that are peculiarly female… sex 
differences in delinquency are independently corroborated by self-report, victimization, and police data, and they  
 
 
appear to hold cross-culturally as well as historically” (p. 143). Torgler and Valev (2007) find strong evidence 
that women report a lower justifiability of committing illegal activities than men. The results remain robust after 
investigating different time periods and extending the specification with several opportunity factors such as 
education, employment status or income.  
 
d) Marital status 
Marital status is a further control variable (dummy variable, value 1 if the respondent is married). Married people 
may be more compliant than others, especially compared to singles because they are more constrained by their 
social network (Tittle 1980). It is also argued that marriage alters public behavior (Swamy et al. 2001). Tittle 
(1980) found significant differences between the different marital statuses, with the greatest evidence for the 
singles, followed by the separated or divorced. However, controlling for age, the results show that the association 
between deviance and marital status was a reflection of age difference, as older persons are more likely to be 
married or widowed and age was a strong predictor concerning the deviance. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) also 
point out that the literature on crime finds that marital status does not seem to have an impact on the likelihood of 
crime.  
 
e) Economic situation 
As a proxy for income we use the economic situation of an individual (dummies upper class, middle and lower 
class are in the reference group). Using the exact income would produce biases, because of difficulties comparing 
this variable across different countries. Individuals with a higher income are more likely to be asked for a bribe, as 
are those with a better education. Individuals with a lower income might have lower social “stakes” or restrictions 
but are less in a position to take risks, because of a high marginal utility loss (wealth reduction) if they are caught 
and penalized.  
 
f) Occupation status 
Another variable is the occupation status as it affects whether the respondent is in a position to benefit from 
corruption (see Swamy et al. 2001). We will use a dummy variable for self-employed individuals as they might be  
 
 
in the best position to invest in bribing and benefit from corruption. Such a status may have an impact on the 
norms regarding bribery.  
 
g) Risk attitudes 
We include a dummy variable that measures risk aversion
6 as individual willingness to behave illegally could also 
be a function of risk attitudes. It is interesting that few prior survey studies have controlled for risk attitudes, since 
risk aversion reduces the incentive to act illegally. Furthermore, controlling for risk attitudes affords better 
insights regarding the variables of age, gender, or economic situation. It could be argued that the observed 




Mocan (2004) stresses that in larger cities the extent of bribery may be higher since the scale of economic 
activities is larger and more varied in scope, resulting in increased contact with the government. Moreover, 
government officials may be less personal compared to those in smaller cities: this may reduce the opportunity 




                                                      
6 Now I would like to ask you something about the things which would seem to you personally, most important if you were looking a 
job. Here are some of the things many people take into account in relation to their work. Regardless of whether you’re actually looking 
for a job, which one would you, personally, place first if you were looking for a job? 
1.  A good income so that you do not have any worries about money 
2.  A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment 
3.  Working with people you like 
4.  Doing an important job which gives you a feeling of accomplishment 
And what would be your second choice? 
A dummy variable was built with the value 1, if someone has chosen 2 as first or as second choice. 
7 V232. Size of town: 
1. Under 2,000 
2. 2,000 - 5,000 
3. 5 - 10,000 
4. 10 - 20,000 
5. 20 - 50,000 
6. 50 - 100,000 
7. 100 - 500,000 




Religion might influence people’s habits and act as a restriction on engaging in illegal activities (Torgler 2006). 
We take the frequency of church attendance (CHURCH ATTENDANCE
8) as the religious variable, showing 
approximately how much time individuals devote to religion. It is anticipated that this variable tells more about 
behavior than self-reported religious attitudes.  
 
j) Political trust 
Economists have recently started to pay attention to the determinants of trust through the literature on compliance 
(e.g. Torgler 2007). Trust in the state might influence citizens’ positive attitudes and commitment to the rules of a 
society, which ultimately has a negative effect on illegal activities. Those institutions perceived by citizens as 
trustworthy, fair and efficient could act as constraints on corruption. We are exploring several different dimensions 
of trust, namely trust in the legal system
9, trust in the government
10, and trust in the parliament
11.  The analysis will 
therefore cover trust at the constitutional and current politico-economic level. Controlling for this variable will 
better check the impact of political interest since individuals with a lower level of political trust might be frustrated 
and therefore less interested in following politics.  
 
k) Voice, Accountability and Democratic Rights 
We also control for institutional conditions. In particular, it is important to control for the citizens’ opportunity to 
translate their political interest into political actions; i.e. whether they have a meaningful ‘voice’ in influencing the 
state (e.g., through voting processes). Holding such institutional conditions constant allows analysis of how strong 
political interest can affect corruption. In general, the greater the ‘voice’ of citizens, the less we expect to observe 
corruption, all other things being equal.  A progressive government can attempt to increase or initiate co-operation 
and generate trust by developing functioning institutions.  Furthermore, co-operation is enhanced when citizens are 
                                                      
8 Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a 
week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never. (7 = more than once a week to 1 = never or 
practically never). 
9 Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not 
very much confidence or none at all? (4= a great deal to 1=none at all).  
10 Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government in your capital: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (4= a great deal to 1=none at all). 
11 Could you tell me how much confidence you have in parliament: Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not 




satisfied with the way they are treated.  On the other hand, if certain sectors of the government are not benevolent, 
strong institutional instruments have the potential to control politicians’ discretionary power. Voter power helps 
limit the abuse of political power by selfish politicians especially since citizens cannot completely foresee the 
incumbents’ preferences.  The elements of direct democracy can also empower citizens with an instrument for 
controlling the government. Such control has an ex ante effect on policy formulation by elected incumbents in that 
they must always take into account possible voter intervention. Levi (1988) points out that a possible consequence 
of creating or maintaining compliance is to provide reassurance by the government. A government that precommits 
itself with democratic rules imposes self-restraints on its own power and thus sends a signal that taxpayers are seen 
as responsible persons. Furthermore, direct democratic rules signal that citizens are not ignorant or 
uncomprehending voters, which might create or maintain a certain social capital stock that should also affect the 
justifiability of corruption. 
In the cross-country study we use Kaufmann et al. (2003) variable VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY for 
the year 1996.  The variable measures the political process, civil liberties, and political rights of a country. We are 
going to use an index of the degree of direct democracy developed by Stutzer (1999) and applied in papers such as 
Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002), Frey and Feld (2002), Torgler (2005), Schaltegger and Torgler (2007) when 
exploring Switzerland. The index reflects the extent of direct democratic participation (1= lowest and 6= highest 
degree of participation) at the cantonal level. 
 
l) Regions 
We will also control for regional differences considering the dummies CEE and FSU (Central Eastern and Former 
Soviet Union countries), LATIN AMERICA, ASIA and AFRICA
12.  The reference group consists of WESTERN 
EUROPE + USA + AUSTRALIA. It can be assumed that there are regional differences in the perceived 
corruption and justifiability of corruption. We expect a lower perceived corruption in the reference group 
countries, based on a historically high standard of rule of law and accountable systems of governance. 
Furthermore, it is possible that a higher justifiability of corruption exists in countries where these important 
factors are lacking.  
                                                      




IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
We will use a weighted ordered probit estimation to correct the samples and thus to get a reflection of the national 
distribution. In estimations where several countries are pooled we have integrated an additional weighting 
variable. To obtain an equal number of weighted observations (around 1500) for each survey, the original weight 
variable was multiplied by a constant for each country
13. The ordered probit models are relevant in such an 
analysis insofar as they help analyze the ranking information of the scaled dependent variable. However, since  
equations in the ordered probit estimation have a nonlinear form, only the sign of the coefficient can be directly 
interpreted and not its size. Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a method to find the quantitative effect of 
a variable on our dependent variable. The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of individuals (or the 
probability of) belonging to a specific perceived corruption (justifiability) level, when the independent variable 
increases by one unit. In all estimations the marginal effects are presented only for the highest value. Furthermore, 
it should be noticed that answers such as “don’t know” and missing values have been eliminated in all 
estimations. 
 
4.1 International Evidence 
Tables 1  to 6 present the first results. Tables 1, 3 and 5 explore the justifiability of corruption as dependent 
variable, while Tables 2, 4, and 6 analyze the perceived corruption. Tables 1 and 2 investigate the impact of 
political discussion. Tables 3 and 4 take a look at the interest in politics and Tables 5 and 6 report the findings 
focusing on the importance of politics. In all tables we present four specifications. This provides a robustness 
check of our main variable while taking into account that the number of observations decreases from one 
estimation to the other. The baseline specification is presented in the first regression. In a next step we add 
variables that measure individuals’ economic situation. In a third regression we include also the three variables on 
political trust. Finally, we report a fourth regression that controls for institutional conditions within a country, 
focusing on voice and accountability. The results clearly indicate that political interest matters: in 19 out of 20 
                                                      
13 The World Values Survey provides the weighting variables.  
 
 
regressions the coefficient is statistically significant. We observe that a higher level of political interest leads to a 
lower justifiability of corruption and also to a lower perceived level of corruption. The marginal effects vary 
between 0.4 percentage points to 3.7 percentage points. Focusing on the justifiability of corruption, we were not 
able to observe a decrease in the impact of political interest when controlling for political trust and voice and 
accountability. On the contrary, we observe an increase in the marginal effects. For example, in Table 1 we 
observe that an increase in the political discussion level by one unit increases the probability of stating that 
corruption is never justifiable by 1.3 percentage points. Looking at perceived corruption, we observe a decrease in 
the marginal effects. However, the results still indicate that the effects are not at all negligible. For example, 
specification (8) in Table 2 indicates that an increase in the political discussion scale by one unit reduces the 
probability of reporting the highest level of corruption by 1.6 percentage points.  
While we observe that political interest matters, we cannot observe a statistically significant correlation 
between education and our two dependent variables (showing a negative sign in both cases ). Thus, informal 
education seems to be much more important than education. This finding suggests that it is important to generate 
“political human capital” rather than just generalized human capital.  
  Interestingly, we observe that voice and accountability reduces the justifiability of corruption and the 
perceived level of corruption. The coefficient is highly statistically significant in all specifications while also 
reporting large marginal effects. Thus, the findings indicate that a more legitimate and responsive state is an 
essential factor for a lower level of corruption. Similarly, political trust has a negative impact on the justifiability 
of corruption and the perceived level of corruption. The joint role played by political trust can be investigated 
using a Wald-test for coefficient restrictions to test for joint significance. In all cases we can observe that the null 
hypothesis is rejected, meaning that the political trust variables play a significant role in the determination of 
countries’ corruption level. Trust in the legal system provides the most consistent result in all the tables. Thus, 
trust at the constitutional level seems to be more important than trust at the current politico-economic level. The 
marginal effects are quite substantial, particularly for the perceived corruption regressions.  
  Looking at the other variables we observe that all age groups from 30 to 65+ have a significantly lower 
justifiability of corruption than the reference group below 30. Interestingly, we can observe that the marginal 
effects increase consistently with an increase of the age group. However, looking at the variable perceived  
 
 
corruption, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant with marginal effects varying between 2.2 and 
4.9 percentage points and increasing with age. Thus, the level of perceived corruption decreases with an increase 
in age. Furthermore, the results also indicate that there are gender differences. Being female rather than male 
increases the probability of a person stating that accepting a bribe is never justifiable. This result indicates that 
women’s norms regarding bribery differs from the norms held by men. However, the perceived corruption 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that women perceive corruption to be more 
widespread than men. Moreover, married people are more sensitive to the social norm regarding bribery than 
individuals with any other marital status. However, the coefficient is only statistically significant for the 
estimations using justifiability of corruption as the dependent variable. We observe that being in a higher income 
class leads to a lower justifiability of corruption and surprisingly, we also observe a negative correlation when 
focusing on perceived corruption. Self-employed people are more tolerant towards corruption and perceive 
corruption to be more common. Being risk averse is correlated with a lower justifiability of corruption. The 
coefficient is statistically significant in all the regressions. On the other hand, we don’t observe a statistically 
significant relationship between perceived corruption and political interest. In line with our expectations we also 
observe a negative relationship between urbanization and justifiability of corruption and a negative between 
urbanization and perceived corruption. The results also show that church attendance is enforcing the norm of 
compliance. The correlation between church attendance and justifiability of corruption is positive, although the 
coefficient is not always statistically significant and the marginal effects are not that large. Not surprisingly, we 
find strong regional differences. Moreover, inhabitants of CEE and FSU, Latin America and Africa
14 countries 
report a higher justifiability of bribing when compared to the reference group. Thus, the findings show that the 
social norm regarding bribery is unambiguously higher in Western Europe, USA and AUSTRALIA. We also 
observe that the reference group has the lowest perceived level of corruption.  
  In sum, the estimation results presented in Table 1 to 6 suggest that political interest matters, controlling in 
a multivariate analysis for additional factors. This is consistent with the theoretical argument developed in Section 
II. It is interesting to observe the importance of political trust and voice and accountability in this context.    
                                                      
14 As mentioned, Africa only covers the country Nigeria. This explains why in some regressions Africa is no longer reported (variable 
not collected this survey).   
 
 
It is reasonable to question the direction of causality in the results, and therefore our main hypothesis can 
be criticized. One can argue that a higher level of perceived corruption may lead to frustration with the lack of 
representative administration, and therefore to a lower willingness to invest in the maintenance of political 
interest. Similarly, a higher justifiability of corruption may induce individuals to be less interested in what 
happens in politics, although the causality problem may be more severe when focusing on individuals’ perceived 
level of corruption. Thus, to evaluate the direct effect of political interest on corruption it is useful to investigate 
any potential causality problems through use of an instrumental variable technique. We present in Table 7 six 
2SLS estimations providing also detailed diagnostic tests to check the robustness of the results. For simplicity 
(and due to less causality problems) we will work with the second regression in the previous tables. The results 
remain robust when considering a broader specification.  In the first three specifications we focus on the 
justifiability of corruption and the last three on the perceived corruption. The results indicate that all three political 
interest proxies are statistically significant with a positive sign.  
Political interest is instrumented through an index that measures the importance of private interests
15. We 
report the first-stage regression results of the instrumental variables and the F-tests of the exclusion of the 
instruments. Overall, the instrument used is effective in explaining political interest. The instrument is always 
statistically significant at the 1% level, as are the F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage 
regressions. On the other hand, the variable is not correlated with our dependent variable. We also report the 
Anderson canonical correlations LR test for the relevance of the instruments. A rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicates that the model is identified and that the instruments are relevant (see Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox 1996). 
Moreover, we also report the Anderson-Rubin test that the endogenous variables are jointly statistically 
significant. The test has the advantage of being robust to the presence of weak instruments. Table 7 reports that in 
all cases the Anderson canonical correlations LR test shows rejection of the null hypothesis, which indicates that 
the models are identified and that the instruments are relevant. The Anderson-Rubin test is also statistically 
significant. In all the cases, this test fails to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. Thus, the 
2SLS specifications also provide support that political interest matters.  
                                                      
15 Mean value of the following three questions: Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life: family, friends, 




4.2 Within-Country Evidence 
In general, drawing conclusions from cross-cultural comparisons is difficult because not all features specific to a 
country can always be controlled in a satisfactory manner. Thus, we extend our study, focusing on within-country 
data from Switzerland at the state (cantonal) level to investigate the impact of tax morale and institutional quality. 
As mentioned previously, analyses of Swiss data are interesting because Switzerland’s institutions are not 
homogeneous. The degree of institutionalized political participation rights varies strongly between the 26 Swiss 
cantons. In line with the previous regressions, we are going to investigate the third wave. This is the latest 
available data set for Switzerland as the country did not participate in the fourth wave. Table 8 and 9 present the 
results. We make one small change to the specification structure: instead of voice and accountability we are going 
to include a democracy index
16 measured at the cantonal level. The degree of direct democratic participation 
rights is measured with an index developed by Stutzer (1999). To maximize the number of available observations 
we first run regressions without the variable income
17 as this variable would reduce the number of observations by 
almost 200 subjects. However, in a second step we are going to discuss the results of regressions where we 
include income as a control variable.  
We observe that political interest also matters for Switzerland, and the quantitative effects are quite 
substantial. For example, increase in the political discussion scale by one unit raises the probability of stating that 
corruption is never justifiable by 4.9 percentage points. The effect is even more relevant in further specifications. 
For example, if we include income in the regression, we observe the coefficient for interest in politics in Table 8 
is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value=2.15).  Interestingly, we observe that a higher level of direct 
                                                      
16 It should be noticed that the Swiss World Value Survey was not random-random but quota-random, based on a random sample of 
communes and then on quotas in terms of sex, age, etc. in the selected communes. Thus, the smallest cantons are not necessarily 
represented (not represented are: Appenzell a. Rh., Glarus, Jura, Nidwalden, Uri, and Zug). On the other hand, the ISSP data set contains 
all 26 cantons.  
17 Here is a scale of incomes (1-10). We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and 
other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions.  
1.  Less then 20’000 Swiss Francs 
2.  20’000-26’999 
3.  27’000-31’999 
4.  32’000-37’999 
5.  38’000-44’999 
6.  45’000-51’999 
7.  52’000-59’999 
8.  60’000-69’999 
9.  70’000-89’999 
10.  More than 90’000  
 
 
democracy is positively correlated with a lower justifiability of corruption. We also observe the tendency that 
trust in the legal system matters, particularly when focusing on the perceived level of corruption. We have only 
included this political trust variable in the specification as it had the strongest impact on corruption in the previous 
six tables. In addition, it allows us to avoid a decrease in the number of observations. As in the previous approach, 
we also observe that age, gender and marital status (being married) matter for justifiability of corruption. On the 
other hand, risk attitudes are relevant when focusing on the perceived corruption rather than on the justifiability of 
corruption. Similarly, urbanization and self-employment status are not relevant at all. Moreover, religion is only 
relevant when focusing on perceived corruption. It is also worthwhile to note that we did not find a significant 
relationship between income and political interest in Switzerland. Finally, in line with the previous findings we 
observe that overall, formal education is less relevant than informal education or political interest. The coefficient 
is only statistically significant in Table 9 and the marginal effects are below the values found for political interest. 
Thus, here we find additional support that human capital is mainly relevant in a specialized form.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In recent years the topic of corruption has attracted a great deal of attention. However, there is still a lack of 
empirical evidence about the determinants of corruption at the micro level. Moreover, there are still interesting 
variables that have not been investigated in the past. This empirical study analyses a cross-section of individuals 
using data from the World Values Survey, investigating the determinants of corruption with two dependent 
variables: perceived corruption and the justifiability of corruption. Both variables are strongly correlated with 
other commonly used measurements of corruption such as the Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index, the International Country Risk Guide Index or the Quality of Government Corruption Index. The major 
aim in the paper was to investigate whether political interest matters. Despite economists’ increasing interest in 
the determinants of corruption, this factor has been widely neglected in the literature. Thus, it was highly relevant 
that we investigated empirically the possible connections between political interest and corruption.  
To check the robustness we explored the relationship between political interest and corruption using three 
different proxies of political interest. The results clearly indicate that use of an education variable does not reflect  
 
 
the accumulation and stock of human capital.  A further strength of the paper is to focus not only on the perceived 
level of corruption, (as is commonly the case in the current literature), but also to consider the justifiability of 
bribery. Moreover, we have provided cross-country and within-country evidence at the micro level, controlling for 
the state of relevant institutional conditions. In this study, our focus on political interest required that we control 
for voice and accountability and direct democratic rights.  
  The econometric estimates also suggest that strength of social norms regarding bribery is higher and the 
perceived level of corruption lower in the reference group (region Western Europe, USA and Austria) compared 
to CEE and FSU countries, Latin America, Asia and Africa.  
  All in all, the results suggest some interesting political implications. Increasing the level of interest in 
politics may help to reduce the level of corruption in a society. The results also suggest that it may be important to 
place more emphasis on institutions that enhance voice and accountability and democratic participation rights. 
This helps to increase individuals’ social norm and perception of compliance. Thus, the results presented in this 
paper mirror those in previous studies and underscore the importance of accountability as an essential aspect for 
the efficient functioning of a government and the existing institutional architecture. However, understanding how 
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Justifiability of Corruption and Political Discussion 
 











a) Political Interest                             
POLITICIAL DISCUSSION  0.026**  2.29 0.008  0.031***  2.62 0.010  0.035***  2.91 0.011  0.052***  3.28 0.017 
b) Education                  
FORMAL  0.001  0.20 0.0002  0.002  0.64 0.001  0.006* 1.68 0.002  0.005  0.93 0.001 
c) Demographic Factors                  
AGE 30-49  0.187***  10.06 0.059 0.187***  9.86  0.059 0.191***  9.70  0.060 0.172***  6.67  0.054 
AGE 50-64  0.383***  15.96 0.111 0.390***  15.82 0.113 0.390***  15.27 0.113 0.364***  10.76 0.106 
AGE 65+  0.503***  15.44 0.136 0.522***  15.50 0.141 0.526***  14.97 0.142 0.524***  11.30 0.140 
FEMALE  0.139***  9.67 0.044  0.141***  9.57 0.045  0.143***  9.36 0.045  0.157***  7.79 0.050 
d) Marital Status                  
MARRIED  0.123***  6.46 0.039  0.120***  6.16 0.038  0.123***  6.16 0.040  0.119***  4.49 0.038 
WIDOWED  0.154***  4.32 0.047  0.146***  3.96 0.044  0.138***  3.59 0.042  0.102**  2.09 0.031 
DIVORCED  0.016  0.42 0.005  0.006  0.16 0.002  0.008  0.21 0.003  0.013  0.27 0.004 
SEPARATED  0.068  1.29 0.021  0.076  1.43 0.024  0.095* 1.72 0.029  0.082  1.15 0.025 
e) Economic Variables                  
UPPER CLASS       -0.193*** -3.57  -0.065  -0.181*** -3.20 -0.061  -0.144**  -2.00 -0.048 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS       -0.019 -0.97  -0.006  -0.032 -1.58  -0.010  -0.026 -0.93  -0.008 
f) Employment Status                  
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.062**  -2.37 -0.020  -0.068**  -2.52 -0.022  -0.057**  -2.06 -0.019  -0.096***  -2.76 -0.031 
g) Risk Attitudes                  
RISK AVERSE  0.077***  4.99 0.024  0.073***  4.57 0.023  0.073***  4.46 0.023  0.077***  3.47 0.024 
h) Urbanization                  
URBANIZATION  -0.007**  -2.53 -0.002  -0.006**  -2.24 -0.002  -0.005  -1.55 -0.001  -0.009**  -2.34 -0.003 
i) Religiosity                  
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.012***  3.09 0.004  0.009**  2.21 0.003  0.006  1.49 0.002  -0.001 -0.13  0.000 
j) Political Trust                  
LEGAL SYSTEM          0.040*** 4.07  0.013  0.071*** 5.46  0.023 
GOVERNMENT          -0.007 -0.58  -0.002  0.041***  2.78 0.013 
PARLIAMENT          0.022* 1.87 0.007  0.015  1.01 0.005 
k) Institutional Conditions                   
 
 
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.                 0.113*** 7.43  0.036 
l) Geographic Region                     
CEE and FSU   -0.380***  -20.50  -0.121  -0.382***  -19.87 -0.122 -0.377***  -18.88 -0.120     
LATIN AMERICA   -0.430***  -17.92  -0.147  -0.429***  -17.50  -0.147 -0.418***  -16.56 -0.143 -0.263***  -5.82  -0.084 
ASIA    0.204***  6.31 0.061  0.348***  9.64 0.098  0.360***  9.28 0.101  -0.030 -0.68  -0.009 
AFRICA  -0.230***  -3.91 -0.078  -0.193***  -3.17 -0.065 -0.228***  -3.60  -0.077 0.611***  11.26  0.157 
Wald-test joint sign. polit. 
trust 
        3 0 . 6 6 0           
Pseudo R2  0.025       0.027       0.027       0.034      
Number of observations  41714       39669       36726       20373      
Prob > chi2  0.000        0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE, LOWER MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASS, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, RISK TAKER, WESTERN EUROPE  
+ USA + AUSTRALIA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest score (10, never justifiable). The higher the value the lower 
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Perceived Corruption and Political Discussion 
 











a) Political Interest                             
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  -0.030***  -2.94 -0.009  -0.030***  -2.89 -0.009  -0.024**  -2.27 -0.007  -0.028* -1.95 -0.008 
b) Education                  
FORMAL  -0.009*** -3.19  -0.003  0.000  0.06  0.0001  -0.003  -0.91 -0.001  -0.011**  -2.56 -0.003 
c) Demographic Factors                  
AGE 30-49  -0.039**  -2.29 -0.012  -0.049***  -2.82 -0.015  -0.064***  -3.55 -0.019  -0.024  -1.03 -0.007 
AGE 50-64  -0.092***  -4.35 -0.028  -0.095***  -4.40 -0.029  -0.088***  -3.90 -0.026  -0.025  -0.84 -0.007 
AGE 65+  -0.161***  -5.94 -0.048  -0.159***  -5.76 -0.047  -0.126***  -4.37 -0.037  -0.083**  -2.07 -0.023 
FEMALE  0.020  1.54 0.006  0.027**  2.03 0.008  0.015  1.10 0.005  0.001  0.05 0.000 
d) Marital Status                  
MARRIED  0.011  0.65 0.004  0.011  0.60 0.003  0.026  1.39 0.008  -0.024 -0.93  -0.007 
WIDOWED  -0.028  -0.92 -0.009  -0.041  -1.33 -0.013  -0.012  -0.36 -0.004  -0.101**  -2.43 -0.028 
DIVORCED  0.069**  2.09 0.022  0.061* 1.78 0.019  0.058  1.64 0.018  0.096**  2.03 0.028 
SEPARATED  0.054  1.17 0.017  0.047  1.00 0.015  0.052  1.05 0.016  0.029  0.45 0.008 
e) Economic Variables                  
UPPER CLASS       -0.009  -0.17 -0.003  0.046  0.86  0.014 -0.124* -1.93 -0.034 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS       -0.237***  -13.63 -0.070 -0.190***  -10.58 -0.055 -0.165***  -6.50  -0.045 
f) Employment Status                  
SELFEMPLOYED  0.037  1.51 0.012  0.052**  2.09 0.016  0.019  0.73 0.006  0.044  1.41 0.013 
g) Risk Attitudes                  
RISK AVERSE  0.024*  1.75 0.007  0.011  0.80 0.003  0.006  0.40 0.002  0.011  0.55 0.003 
h) Urbanization                  
URBANIZATION  0.034***  13.54 0.011 0.035***  13.53 0.011 0.024***  9.06  0.007 0.005  1.31  0.001 
i) Religiosity                  
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.003  0.88 0.001  0.005  1.29 0.001  0.019***  5.21 0.006  0.012**  2.27 0.003 
j) Political Trust                  
LEGAL SYSTEM          -0.153***  -16.84 -0.046 -0.161***  -13.20 -0.046 
GOVERNMENT          -0.124***  -12.23 -0.038 -0.130***  -9.71  -0.037 
PARLIAMENT          -0.174***  -16.20 -0.053 -0.164***  -11.77 -0.047 
k) Institutional Conditions                   
 
 
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.              -0.159*** -11.240 -0.045 
l) Geographic Region                  
CEE  and  FSU    0.940***  58.66 0.294 0.894***  53.98 0.280 0.918***  53.36 0.281 0.979***  24.51 0.288 
LATIN  AMERICA    0.680***  30.80 0.236 0.635***  28.18 0.220 0.632***  27.17 0.214 0.590***  14.88 0.183 
ASIA    0.542***  20.52 0.192 0.523***  19.37 0.185 0.760***  25.67 0.274 0.889***  20.39 0.311 
AFRICA  1.276***  21.64 0.475 1.250***  20.26 0.466 1.320***  19.67 0.488      
Wald-test joint sign. polit. 
trust 
        1 8 6 7 . 9 2           
Pseudo R2  0.025       0.027       0.027       0.106      
Number of observations  41714       39669       36726       18942      
Prob > chi2  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    
Notes: In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE, LOWER MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASS, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, RISK TAKER, WESTERN EUROPE  
+ USA + AUSTRALIA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest score (4). The higher the value the lower the justifiability. 
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Justifiability of Corruption and Interest in Politics 











a) Political Interest                             
INTEREST POLITICS  0.013  1.57 0.004  0.018**  2.22 0.006  0.016* 1.87 0.005  0.041***  3.58 0.013 
b) Education                  
FORMAL  0.001  0.24 0.0003  0.002  0.66 0.001  0.007* 1.82 0.002  0.004  0.73 0.001 
c) Demographic Factors                  
AGE 30-49  0.190***  10.30 0.060 0.190***  10.05 0.060 0.193***  9.91  0.061 0.178***  6.96  0.056 
AGE 50-64  0.390***  16.32 0.113 0.396***  16.19 0.115 0.398***  15.64 0.116 0.374***  11.13 0.108 
AGE 65+  0.504***  15.54 0.137 0.525***  15.66 0.142 0.529***  15.10 0.143 0.526***  11.40 0.141 
FEMALE  0.136***  9.50 0.043  0.139***  9.47 0.044  0.138***  9.06 0.044  0.151***  7.56 0.048 
d) Marital Status                  
MARRIED  0.123***  6.50 0.039  0.119***  6.16 0.038  0.124***  6.24 0.040  0.119***  4.52 0.038 
WIDOWED  0.146***  4.11 0.044  0.136***  3.70 0.041  0.132***  3.45 0.040  0.088* 1.81 0.027 
DIVORCED  0.016  0.44 0.005  0.006  0.17 0.002  0.012  0.32 0.004  0.015  0.29 0.005 
SEPARATED  0.068  1.28 0.021  0.075  1.40 0.023  0.097* 1.76 0.030  0.083  1.15 0.025 
e) Economic Variables                  
UPPER CLASS       -0.203*** -3.82  -0.069  -0.193*** -3.46 -0.065  -0.158**  -2.22 -0.052 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS       -0.021 -1.04  -0.007  -0.033 -1.62  -0.011  -0.033 -1.15  -0.010 
f) Employment Status                  
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.065**  -2.48 -0.021  -0.070***  -2.62 -0.023  -0.063**  -2.27 -0.020  -0.098***  -2.82 -0.032 
g) Risk Attitudes                  
RISK AVERSE  0.077***  4.97 0.024  0.072***  4.53 0.023  0.074***  4.48 0.023  0.078***  3.52 0.024 
h) Urbanization                  
URBANIZATION  -0.006**  -2.29 -0.002  -0.006**  -2.05 -0.002 -0.004  -1.48  -0.001 -0.008*  -1.94  -0.002 
i) Religiosity                  
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.010***  2.67 0.003  0.007* 1.72 0.002  0.005  1.19 0.002  -0.001 -0.22  0.000 
j) Political Trust                  
LEGAL SYSTEM          0.039*** 3.94  0.012  0.069*** 5.34  0.022 
GOVERNMENT          -0.009 -0.78  -0.003  0.036**  2.46 0.011 
PARLIAMENT          0.021* 1.76 0.007  0.014  0.92 0.004  
 
 
k) Institutional Conditions                  
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.          -0.375***  -18.84 -0.120 0.117***  7.71  0.037 
l) Geographic Region                      
CEE and FSU   -0.379***  -20.45  -0.121  -0.380***  -19.78  -0.121 -0.417***  -16.47 -0.143 -0.252***  -5.58  -0.080 
LATIN AMERICA   -0.430***  -17.86  -0.147  -0.425***  -17.29 -0.145 0.368***  9.55  0.104  -0.020  -0.47  -0.006 
ASIA    0.212***  6.57  0.063 0.357***  9.96  0.101 -0.212***  -3.40 -0.072  0.620***  11.51 0.160 
AFRICA  -0.226***  -3.90  -0.077  -0.184***  -3.08  -0.062          
Wald-test joint sign. polit. 
trust 
        26.80*** 
 
        
Pseudo R2  0.025    0.027       0.027       0.034      
Number of observations  42056    40002       37018       20576       
Prob > chi2  0.000    0.000        0.000        0.000     
Notes: In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE, LOWER MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASS, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, RISK TAKER, WESTERN EUROPE  
+ USA + AUSTRALIA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest score (10, never justifiable). The higher the value the lower 
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Perceived Corruption and Political Interest 
 











a) Political Interest                             
INTEREST IN POLITICS  -0.090***  -12.31 -0.028 -0.087***  -11.80 -0.027 -0.053***  -6.80  -0.016 -0.055***  -5.28  -0.016 
b) Education                  
FORMAL  -0.003 -0.89  -0.001  0.006**  2.13 0.002  0.0003 0.09 0.0001  -0.009**  -2.06  -0.003 
c) Demographic Factors                  
AGE 30-49  -0.027  -1.58 -0.008  -0.037**  -2.17 -0.012  -0.058***  -3.22 -0.018  -0.021  -0.90 -0.006 
AGE 50-64  -0.068***  -3.27 -0.021  -0.073***  -3.43 -0.023  -0.076***  -3.38 -0.023  -0.018  -0.60 -0.005 
AGE 65+  -0.138***  -5.09 -0.041  -0.137***  -4.97 -0.041  -0.116***  -4.03 -0.034  -0.076* -1.90 -0.021 
FEMALE  0.002  0.13 0.001  0.009  0.67 0.003  0.006  0.43 0.002  -0.007 -0.36  -0.002 
d) Marital Status                  
MARRIED  0.012  0.69 0.004  0.012  0.65 0.004  0.026  1.40 0.008  -0.023 -0.91  -0.007 
WIDOWED  -0.022  -0.73 -0.007  -0.036  -1.17 -0.011  -0.008  -0.25 -0.002  -0.096**  -2.31 -0.027 
DIVORCED  0.076**  2.31 0.024  0.069**  2.02 0.022  0.068* 1.94 0.021  0.105**  2.21 0.031 
SEPARATED  0.075  1.63 0.024  0.070  1.49 0.022  0.075  1.55 0.023  0.050  0.79 0.015 
e) Economic Variables                  
UPPER CLASS       -0.018  -0.36 -0.006  0.033  0.63  0.010 -0.140**  -2.21 -0.038 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS       -0.228***  -13.16 -0.067 -0.186***  -10.40 -0.054 -0.162***  -6.40  -0.044 
f) Employment Status                  
SELFEMPLOYED  0.037  1.51 0.012  0.050**  2.05 0.016  0.016  0.61 0.005  0.039  1.27 0.011 
g) Risk Attitudes                  
RISK AVERSE  0.017  1.25 0.005  0.005  0.36 0.002  0.001  0.07 0.000  0.007  0.35 0.002 
h) Urbanization                  
URBANIZATION  0.034***  13.61 0.011 0.035***  13.56 0.011 0.025***  9.16  0.007 0.005  1.45  0.001 
i) Religiosity                  
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.003  0.85 0.001  0.004  1.27 0.001  0.019***  5.08 0.006  0.010**  1.99 0.003  
 
 
j) Political Trust                  
LEGAL SYSTEM          -0.154***  -17.05 -0.047 -0.160***  -13.15 -0.046 
GOVERNMENT          -0.123***  -12.17 -0.037 -0.131***  -9.81  -0.037 
PARLIAMENT          -0.166***  -15.59 -0.050 -0.153***  -11.07 -0.044 
k) Institutional Conditions                     
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.                 -0.163*** -11.480 -0.047 
l) Geographic Region                     
CEE  and  FSU    0.922***  57.45 0.289 0.879***  53.05 0.276 0.908***  52.68 0.278 0.966***  24.21 0.285 
LATIN  AMERICA    0.644***  28.98 0.223 0.603***  26.60 0.208 0.617***  26.29 0.208 0.574***  14.46 0.178 
ASIA    0.552***  21.00 0.196 0.533***  19.84 0.189 0.772***  26.22 0.278 0.897***  20.71 0.315 
AFRICA  1.273***  21.93 0.474 1.251***  20.53 0.466 1.320***  19.86 0.488            
Wald-test joint sign. polit. 
trust 
        1 8 0 1 . 4 0           
Pseudo R2  0.058       0.059       0.090       0.106      
Number of observations  38646       37245       34752       19136      
Prob > chi2  0.000    0.000        0.000        0.000     
Notes: In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE, LOWER MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASS, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, RISK TAKER, WESTERN EUROPE  
+ USA + AUSTRALIA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest score (4). The higher the value the lower the justifiability. 
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Justifiability of Corruption and Importance of Politics in Life 
 











a) Political Interest                             
IMPORTANCE OF 
POLITICS 
0.023***  2.95 0.007  0.027***  3.33 0.008  0.026***  3.10 0.008  0.055***  4.90 0.017 
b) Education                  
FORMAL  0.001  0.22 0.0002  0.002  0.71 0.001  0.006* 1.79 0.002  0.004  0.84 0.001 
c) Demographic Factors                  
AGE 30-49  0.184***  9.98 0.058  0.186***  9.83 0.058  0.192***  9.82 0.060  0.171***  6.67 0.054 
AGE 50-64  0.383***  16.00 0.111 0.392***  15.99 0.114 0.396***  15.55 0.115 0.362***  10.77 0.105 
AGE 65+  0.506***  15.53 0.137 0.525***  15.59 0.142 0.531***  15.08 0.143 0.526***  11.32 0.141 
FEMALE  0.135***  9.45 0.043  0.136***  9.31 0.043  0.136***  8.97 0.043  0.150***  7.49 0.047 
d) Marital Status                  
MARRIED  0.128***  6.74 0.041  0.122***  6.30 0.039  0.126***  6.31 0.040  0.123***  4.65 0.039 
WIDOWED  0.153***  4.26 0.046  0.139***  3.75 0.042  0.134***  3.47 0.041  0.097***  1.99 0.030 
DIVORCED  0.017  0.46 0.005  0.006  0.15 0.002  0.009  0.22 0.003  0.012  0.25 0.004 
SEPARATED  0.068  1.29 0.021  0.075  1.40 0.023  0.084  1.54 0.026  0.064  0.90 0.020 
e) Economic Variables                  
UPPER CLASS       -0.198*** -3.70  -0.067  -0.186*** -3.32 -0.063  -0.146**  -2.04 -0.048 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS       -0.019***  -0.93 -0.006  -0.031  -1.51 -0.010  -0.028  -0.97 -0.009 
f) Employment Status                  
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.060***  -2.28 -0.019  -0.064**  -2.38 -0.021  -0.055** -2.00  -0.018 -0.089** -2.55  -0.029 
g) Risk Attitudes                  
RISK AVERSE  0.075***  4.81 0.023  0.071***  4.47 0.022  0.073***  4.42 0.023  0.077***  3.48 0.024 
h) Urbanization                  
URBANIZATION  -0.006**  -2.30 -0.002  -0.006**  -2.05 -0.002 -0.004  -1.47  -0.001 -0.007*  -1.84  -0.002 
i) Religiosity                   
 
 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.011***  2.80 0.003  0.008**  1.97 0.002  0.006  1.38 0.002  -0.001 -0.12  0.000 
j) Political Trust                  
LEGAL SYSTEM          0.040*** 4.09  0.013  0.070*** 5.32  0.022 
GOVERNMENT          -0.009 -0.80  -0.003  0.035**  2.36 0.011 
PARLIAMENT          0.018 1.51  0.006  0.008 0.54  0.003 
k) Institutional Conditions                  
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.       -0.381***  -19.72 -0.121 -0.373***  -18.65 -0.119 0.132***  8.56  0.042 
l) Geographic Region                   
CEE and FSU   -0.381***  -20.48  -0.122  -0.435***  -17.73  -0.149 -0.425***  -16.85 -0.146 -0.226***  -4.98  -0.072 
LATIN AMERICA   -0.437***  -18.23  -0.150  0.354***  9.83  0.100  0.367***  9.50  0.103  -0.027  -0.62  -0.009 
ASIA    0.212***  6.56  0.063  -0.217*** -3.60  -0.073  -0.245*** -3.91  -0.084  0.630***  11.67  0.161 
AFRICA  -0.248***  -4.28  -0.085              
Wald-test joint sign. polit. 
trust 
        26.16***        
Pseudo R2  0.025    0.027       0.027       0.034      
Number of observations  41631    39614       36720       20410      
Prob > chi2  0.000    0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE, LOWER MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASS, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, RISK TAKER, WESTERN EUROPE  
+ USA + AUSTRALIA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest score (10, never justifiable). The higher the value the lower 
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Perceived Corruption and Importance of Politics in Life 











a) Political Interest                             
IMPORTANCE OF 
POLITICS 
-0.047***  -6.59 -0.015  -0.045***  -6.23 -0.014  -0.001  -0.15 -0.0003  -0.031***  -3.01 -0.009 
b) Education                  
FORMAL  -0.007**  -2.52 -0.002  0.002  0.70  0.001 -0.004  -1.27 -0.001  -0.011**  -2.54 -0.003 
c) Demographic Factors                  
AGE 30-49  -0.036**  -2.16 -0.011  -0.048***  -2.77 -0.015  -0.067***  -3.71 -0.020  -0.023  -0.99 -0.007 
AGE 50-64  -0.085***  -4.04 -0.026  -0.090***  -4.19 -0.028  -0.091***  -4.08 -0.027  -0.021  -0.71 -0.006 
AGE 65+  -0.152***  -5.62 -0.045  -0.153***  -5.52 -0.046  -0.131***  -4.52 -0.038  -0.078* -1.94 -0.022 
FEMALE  0.018  1.38 0.006  0.024* 1.84 0.008  0.020  1.45 0.006  0.002  0.08 0.000 
d) Marital Status                  
MARRIED  0.011  0.62 0.003  0.011  0.61 0.003  0.026  1.36 0.008  -0.026 -1.02  -0.007 
WIDOWED  -0.033  -1.11 -0.010  -0.045  -1.45 -0.014  -0.016  -0.48 -0.005  -0.110***  -2.64 -0.030 
DIVORCED  0.076**  2.30 0.024  0.068**  2.02 0.022  0.067* 1.89 0.021  0.101**  2.12 0.030 
SEPARATED  0.060  1.29 0.019  0.054  1.13 0.017  0.061  1.24 0.019  0.031  0.49 0.009 
e) Economic Variables                  
UPPER CLASS       -0.026  -0.51 -0.008  0.022  0.43  0.007 -0.157**  -2.52 -0.042 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS       -0.239***  -13.75 -0.070 -0.195***  -10.88 -0.056 -0.171***  -6.72  -0.046 
f) Employment Status                  
SELFEMPLOYED  0.032  1.31 0.010  0.047* 1.91 0.015  0.015  0.58 0.005  0.036  1.17 0.011 
g) Risk Attitudes                  
RISK AVERSE  0.018  1.31 0.006  0.005  0.37 0.002  0.003  0.22 0.001  0.005  0.28 0.002  
 
 
h) Urbanization                  
URBANIZATION  0.034***  13.43 0.011 0.035***  13.43 0.011 0.024***  8.97  0.007 0.005  1.40  0.001 
i) Religiosity                  
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.004  1.02 0.001  0.005  1.42 0.002  0.019***  5.12 0.006  0.012**  2.27 0.003 
j) Political Trust                  
LEGAL SYSTEM          -0.154***  -16.99 -0.047 -0.160***  -13.13 -0.046 
GOVERNMENT          -0.124***  -12.18 -0.037 -0.130***  -9.70  -0.037 
PARLIAMENT          -0.172***  -16.03 -0.052 -0.156***  -11.15 -0.045 
k) Institutional Conditions                  
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.                 -0.164*** -11.480 -0.047 
l) Geographic Region                   
CEE  and  FSU    0.928***  57.43 0.291 0.883***  52.91 0.277 0.916***  52.73 0.281 0.967***  24.02 0.286 
LATIN  AMERICA    0.684***  31.10 0.238 0.641***  28.49 0.222 0.643***  27.69 0.218 0.599***  15.13 0.187 
ASIA    0.577***  21.99 0.206 0.559***  20.87 0.199 0.792***  27.02 0.286 0.914***  21.09 0.321 
AFRICA  1.305***  22.13 0.485 1.280***  20.78 0.476 1.327***  19.87 0.491      
Wald-test joint sign. polit. 
trust 
        1828.520         
Pseudo R2  0.057    0.058       0.090       0.105      
Number of observations  38277    36899       34476       18979      
Prob > chi2  0.000    0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE, LOWER MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASS, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, RISK TAKER, WESTERN EUROPE  
+ USA + AUSTRALIA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marginal effect = highest score (4). The higher the value the lower the justifiability. 
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2SLS 
JUSTIFIABILITY OF CORRUPTION PERCEIVED  CORRUPTION   
 

























a) Political Interest                               
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  1.520*** 4.33            -0.352*** -2.74         
INTEREST IN POLITICS     0.997** 4.32          -0.234*** -2.69      
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS         0.323*** 4.67       -0.080*** -2.76 
b) Education                      
FORMAL  -0.077*** -3.95  -0.086***  -4.00  -0.021***  -2.90  0.017**  2.40  0.019**  2.42  0.005  1.53 
c) Demographic Factors                      
AGE 30-49  0.098*  1.87 0.126***  2.63  0.246***  7.86  -0.0001  0.00 -0.003 -0.17  -0.033***  -2.67 
AGE 50-64  0.219***  2.82 0.245***  3.31  0.449***  11.98  -0.008 -0.26  -0.008 -0.28  -0.057***  -3.54 
AGE 65+  0.422*** 7.01  0.348***  4.77  0.524***  11.97 -0.083***  -3.30  -0.060*  -1.96 -0.106*** -5.13 
FEMALE  0.447***  6.71 0.418***  6.85  0.221***  9.36  -0.039 -1.62  -0.035 -1.55  0.010  0.94 
d) Marital Status                      
MARRIED  0.098*** 2.58  0.117***  3.26  0.160***  5.04  0.027*  1.88  0.020  1.50  0.013  1.02 
WIDOWED  0.180***  3.55 0.139***  2.76  0.173***  3.84  -0.024 -1.02  -0.016 -0.70  -0.026  -1.17 
DIVORCED  -0.043 -0.66  -0.005  -0.08  0.024  0.42  0.061**  2.40 0.058**  2.33  0.051** 2.14 
SEPARATED  0.117 1.33  0.080  0.92  0.153* 1.93  0.038 1.11  0.057 1.68  0.034  1.01  
 
 
e) Economic Variables                      
UPPER CLASS  -0.311*** -3.02  -0.354***  -3.52  -0.295***  -3.30  0.012  0.31  0.009  0.23  -0.006  -0.15 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS  -0.103*** -2.80  -0.137***  -3.35  -0.037  -1.32  -0.151*** -10.73  -0.141*** -8.80  -0.165***  -13.26 
f) Employment Status                      
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.057 -1.23  -0.063  -1.38  -0.055  -1.31  0.034* 1.87 0.032* 1.79  0.033*  1.89 
g) Risk Attitudes                      
RISK AVERSE  0.102*** 4.20  0.132***  5.21  0.110***  5.01  0.000  -0.01  -0.008  -0.78 -0.003  -0.26 
h) Urbanization                      
URBANIZATION  -0.010** -2.09  -0.004  -0.92 -0.006  -1.50 0.025*** 13.12  0.024*** 12.81 0.024***  13.23 
i) Religiosity                      
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.016***  2.65  0.005  0.88  0.007  1.26  0.002 0.82  0.004 1.63  0.004* 1.69 
j) Geographic Region                      
CEE and FSU   -0.390***  -14.01 -0.224*** -4.01 -0.357*** -12.53  0.638***  54.03  0.598***  28.09  0.626*** 47.63 
LATIN AMERICA   -0.318*** -3.24  -0.187  -1.49  -0.648***  -16.68 0.382***  10.82  0.354***  7.66  0.457***  28.02 
ASIA   0.385*** 7.87  0.422***  7.86  0.246***  8.30  0.354*** 15.60  0.361*** 15.08 0.405***  21.15 
AFRICA  -0.104 -1.08  -0.126  -1.32  -0.336***  -4.10  0.852***  21.08  0.858***  21.78  0.911***  23.21 
First stage regressions:                                  
Political Interest                             
Private Interests  0.079*** 9.87  0.117***  10.34 0.355***  30.15 0.083*** 10.03  0.120*** 10.23 0.359***  29.39 
F-Test of excluded instruments  97.46***    107.02***     909.31***     100.60***     104.73***     863.69***    
Anderson canon. corr. likelihood ratio 










Anderson-Rubin test  24.02***    23.09***     22.29***     7.92***     7.46***     7.64***    
Number of observations  38888    39212     39008     36232     36530     36354    
Prob > F   0.000    0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000    
Notes: In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE, LOWER MIDDLE AND LOWER CLASS, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, RISK TAKER, WESTERN EUROPE  
















Justifiability of Corruption  in Switzerland 







a) Political Interest                      
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  0.177** 2.32  0.049             
INTEREST IN POLITICS       0.117* 1.92  0.032        
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS          0.195*** 3.30  0.053 
b) Education              
FORMAL  -0.039  -1.28 -0.011  -0.040 -1.30 -0.011  -0.041  -1.31 -0.011 
c) Demographic Factors              
AGE 30-49  0.300**  2.26 0.082  0.302**  2.26 0.083  0.272**  2.04 0.073 
AGE 50-64  0.425**  2.48 0.105  0.417**  2.42 0.104  0.452***  2.61 0.108 
AGE 65+  0.589***  2.90 0.135  0.568***  2.79 0.131  0.552***  2.69 0.125 
FEMALE  0.529***  5.49 0.146  0.529***  5.48 0.146  0.522***  5.42 0.141 
d) Marital Status              
MARRIED  0.259* 1.96 0.073  0.265**  2.00 0.075  0.287**  2.14 0.080 
WIDOWED  -0.066  -0.28 -0.019  -0.070 -0.30 -0.020  -0.057  -0.24 -0.016 
DIVORCED  -0.092  -0.46 -0.026  -0.063 -0.32 -0.018  -0.001  0.00  0.000 
SEPARATED  -0.089  -0.25 -0.026  -0.053 -0.15 -0.015  -0.024  -0.06 -0.007 
e) Employment Status              
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.051  -0.29 -0.015  -0.037 -0.21 -0.010  -0.045  -0.24 -0.012 
f) Risk Attitudes               
 
 
RISK AVERSE  0.109  1.07 0.030  0.105 1.05 0.029  0.100  0.99 0.027 
g) Urbanization              
URBANIZATION  -0.005  -0.20 -0.001  -0.005 -0.20 -0.001  -0.013  -0.53 -0.004 
h) Religiosity              
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  -0.008  -0.30 -0.002  -0.008 -0.29 -0.002  -0.022  -0.80 -0.006 
i) Political Trust              
LEGAL SYSTEM  0.115* 1.69 0.032  0.109 1.58 0.030  0.126* 1.83 0.034 
j) Institutional Conditions              
DEMOCRACY  0.030  0.79 0.008  0.027 0.72 0.008  0.013  0.35 0.004 
Pseudo R2  0.049       0.048    0.055      
Number of observations  1086       1086    1075      
Prob > chi2  0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, RISK TAKER, Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 







Perceived Corruption in Switzerland 







a) Political Interest                      
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  -0.067 -0.97  -0.008              
INTEREST IN POLITICS       -0.114** -2.19  -0.014        
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS          -0.100** -2.00  -0.012 
b) Education              
FORMAL  -0.057**  -2.30 -0.007  -0.049* -1.94 -0.006  -0.053**  -2.12 -0.007 
c) Demographic Factors              
AGE 30-49  0.066  0.52 0.008  0.078  0.62 0.010  0.096  0.75 0.012 
AGE 50-64  -0.050  -0.33 -0.006  -0.022  -0.15 -0.003  -0.032  -0.21 -0.004 
AGE 65+  -0.245  -1.42 -0.027  -0.214  -1.23 -0.024  -0.197  -1.12 -0.022 
FEMALE  -0.251*** -2.88  -0.031  -0.265***  -3.00 -0.033  -0.253***  -2.88 -0.031 
d) Marital Status              
MARRIED  0.025  0.21 0.003  0.016  0.14 0.002  0.007  0.06 0.001 
WIDOWED  -0.449* -1.91 -0.042  -0.458* -1.92 -0.042  -0.459* -1.92 -0.041 
DIVORCED  -0.098  -0.44 -0.011  -0.132  -0.58 -0.015  -0.117  -0.52 -0.013 
SEPARATED  -0.273  -0.62 -0.028  -0.267  -0.61 -0.027  -0.310  -0.68 -0.030 
e) Employment Status              
SELFEMPLOYED  -0.010  -0.07 -0.001  -0.014  -0.09 -0.002  -0.057  -0.40 -0.007 
f) Risk Attitudes              
RISK AVERSE  -0.175* -1.90 -0.021  -0.183***  -1.97 -0.022  -0.157* -1.71 -0.018 
g) Urbanization              
URBANIZATION  -0.036  -1.54 -0.005  -0.034  -1.43 -0.004  -0.037  -1.56 -0.005 
h) Religiosity              
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  -0.051** -2.21  -0.006 -0.049**  -2.13 -0.006  -0.047**  -2.00 -0.006 
i) Political Trust              
LEGAL SYSTEM  -0.478*** -7.30  -0.060  -0.477***  -7.31 -0.059  -0.465***  -7.11 -0.057 
j) Institutional Conditions              
DIRECT DEMOCRACY  -0.103*** -3.00  -0.013  -0.098***  -2.87 -0.012  -0.099***  -2.88 -0.012  
 
 
Pseudo R2  0.077       0.080    0.077      
Number of observations  1019       1018    1008      
Prob > chi2  0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: In the reference group are AGE<30, MAN, SINGLE, OTHER EMPLOYMENT STATUS, RISK TAKER, Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 
0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
APPENDIX  
 
T T Ta a ab b bl l le e e     A A A1 1 1     
Countries in the Sample (34 countries) 
countries 
  
Armenia   Moldova  
Australia   Nigeria.  
Azerbaijan   Norway  
Bangladesh   Peru  
Belarus   Philippines  
Bosnia-Hercegovina Russia   
Brazil   Serbia  
Bulgaria   Slovenia  
Chile   Spain  
Croatia   Switzerland  
Estonia   Taiwan  
Finland   Ukraine  
India   Uruguay  
Latvia   USA  
Lithuania   Venezuela  
Macedonia   Western Germany
a  
Mexico Eastern  Germany
a 
Notes: 
a The data allows differentiation between East and West Germany.  
 
 
 